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Dear Friends,
What light can scholars at Santa Clara University shed onthe two most vexing ethical problems that are gripping thecountry, namely the invasion of Iraq and the sexual abuse
of minors by Catholic clergy? The events of Sept 11, 2001, radically
changed the attitude of the United States toward groups and nations that
threaten us. Few Americans seem to realize that 9/11 led to a funda-
mental change in the official U.S. strategic doctrine, moving away from the strategies that had been in
place since the end of World War II to a policy that endorses preventive, unilateral military action
against any group that poses a sufficient threat to national security. Although the demise of Saddam
Hussein’s brutal regime is welcome, will we come to regret the means employed to achieve that goal?
Three faculty members with extensive experience in the Middle East and Muslim countries help us
think through the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. From the political science department,
William James Stover analyzes the new “Bush Doctrine” that justifies preventive attacks and the
“Rumsfeld Doctrine” that made it operational in Iraq. He does so against the backdrop of the ethical
restraints on war embodied in the Just War tradition. David E. Skinner of the history department, a
scholar of the history of Muslim nations, points out the intended and unintended consequences of the
invasion of Iraq that have so complicated the situation there. Anthropologist Mary Elaine Hegland
spent the past year in the Turkey, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan, where she learned of local peoples’ reac-
tions to the American military actions. A panel of SCU faculty wrestles with the question of whether
the new U. S. strategic posture erodes the ethical barriers against the resort to war in international
affairs. Constitutional scholar Margaret M. Russell warns of the erosion of ordinary civil liberties by
the extraordinary legal measures adopted in the war on terror. David L. Perry, now professor of ethics
at the U.S. Army War College, examines the ambivalent attitude toward violence in the scriptures of
all three religions that clash in the Middle East: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
Our final essay turns to the second crisis. In an op-ed piece in the San Jose Mercury News last year, Uni-
versity President Paul Locatelli, S.J., promised that Santa Clara would bring its full resources to bear
to understand the crisis and make constructive suggestions to prevent its recurrence. Thomas G.
Plante, professor of psychology, convened an international group of experts at Santa Clara last May to
address the clergy sexual abuse scandal. He will host a second conference May 14, 2004, on campus
to launch the book that the group produced. One of the early researchers on this tragedy, he has been
sought out by the national media to comment on what has become the most serious crisis in the his-
tory of the Catholic Church in the United States.
William C. Spohn
Director, Bannan Center for Jesuit Education
LETTER FROM THE CENTER DIRECTOR
William C. Spohn
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PREEMPTIVE 
WAR: 
The legal and moral implications 
of the Bush and Rumsfeld doctrines
BY  W I L L I A M  J A M E S  S T O V E R
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Santa Clara University
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At the time, I was puzzled by this remark. Would
changes be as drastic as my Jordanian host
feared? The attack exposed the United States’
vulnerability to international terrorism, but
many analysts had predicted the possibility of
massive terror attacks for years. The motives for
the assault underscored a deep hatred for U.S.
economic and military dominance by radical
fundamentalist elements in the Muslim world,
but that realization is not new to anyone who
reads a good newspaper. How would these events
produce the kind of catastrophic change referred
to by the Jordanian official?
Reflecting on his comments today, I now under-
stand the fundamental change wrought by 9/11.
The United States government has reversed a
centuries-old effort to limit war, making it a last
resort for defensive purposes alone. In place of
these efforts at limiting war, our military prepa-
ration is designed to ensure U.S. world domi-
nance in political, economic, and military power
by threatening preemptive war. 
Less than three months after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, I arrived inJordan, one of the United States’ closest partners in the Arab world. A governmentofficial met me in Amman, and we sat in the hotel lounge, drinking dark Middle
Eastern coffee. I was the only non-Arab in the room, for European and North American
travel to the Middle East had been drastically curtailed. 
The official began our conversation by expressing his sympathy for my country’s losses in
New York and Washington. I thanked him, stating my hope that the events would not
lead to deterioration in our relationship. The Jordanian official emphasized his belief that
relations between our two countries would remain warm, but then added, “9/11 changes
everything. The Middle East, even the whole world will never be the same again. You
Christians have used B.C. and A.D. to mark the birth of Christ. Perhaps we should now
use B.N. and A.N. to distinguish before and after 9/11.”
The Measure: 
The Doctrine of Bellum Justum
Recognizing the recurrence of war in human
affairs, philosophers and theologians have sought
to place limits on its use by developing the Doc-
trine of Just War. Their evaluation consists of two
parts: first, the need to consider whether a specific
initiation of war is moral (jus ad bellum), and
second, the need to consider whether the acts
associated with the war are moral (jus in bello). 
Rules established to regulate the conduct of armed
conflict among nation states are based on this
moral philosophy, and they first appear in religious
writings. Ideas about the justice of a specific war
(jus ad bellum) are expressed in the writing of St.
Augustine and St. Aquinas. For these Christian
thinkers, princes could engage in armed conflict
only to avenge injuries caused by an enemy who
has refused to make amends, to punish an injus-
tice, and to restore the status quo. Thus, for the
cause to be “just” there should be a wrong doer
who was subjectively guilty and refused to desist. 
6 BANNAN CENTER FOR JESUIT EDUCATION
These moral principles slowly began to be
accepted by nation-states as customary interna-
tional law, expressed by legal writers such as
Francisco DeVitoria and Hugo Grotius. In
short, state practice indicated that states could
not use armed force to aggrandize themselves, to
deny another country’s basic rights, or to invade
a neighbor in an unprovoked act of aggression.
States also needed to act with proper intentions
such as rectifying an injustice or restoring peace,
not annihilating an enemy. There had to be pro-
portionality between the objects sought through
war and the destruction it caused. A legitimate
authority should declare the war, and violence
had to be the last resort, with less destructive
means exhausted before using armed force.
Jus in bello, justice in war, examines how the acts
associated with war should be conducted, and
these principles are also traced to religious ori-
gins. The Hindu code of Manu required soldiers
to refrain from attacking one who “joins palms
of hands,” sits down, flees, or says “I am yours.”
Abu Bahr reflects Islamic teaching when he
instructs the Muslim army in Syria to refrain
from treachery, mutilations, or killing the old,
women, or children. From China, Sun Tzu
writes that soldiers must treat their captives well
and care for them. St. Augustine demands that
soldiers must not regard the enemy as sub-
human, lacking in basic rights.
These religious principles were also accepted
gradually by nation-states as customary interna-
tional law, expressed most clearly in Francis
Lieber’s Instructions for the Government of the
Armies of the United States in the Field (1863).
This was issued to the Union Army and later
appeared in Russian, French, and Italian military
manuals. In short, the use of armed force was
governed by three principles: military force nec-
essary to subjugate an enemy is permissible (mil-
itary necessity); violence in excess of that is for-
bidden (humanity); and its use should be con-
ducted under a code of fairness (chivalry).
Statespersons and diplomats subsequently
refined these moral principles, already accepted
as customary international law, by negotiating
many treaties during the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Taken as a whole, these
“laws of war” assimilate the moral ideals of the-
ologians and philosophers and the practice of
states regarding jus in bello.
The most definitive statement regarding the
initiation of war (jus ad bellum) is found in the
Charter of the United Nations. Article 2
requires that members “settle their disputes by
peaceful means” and “refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.” Recognizing the persistence of war,
however, Article 51 permits the “inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs … until the Security Coun-
cil has taken measures necessary to maintain
peace and security.” 
Historically, under pre-United Nations custom-
ary international law, this inherent right of self-
defense was limited to an “instant and over-
whelming necessity with no choice of means and
no time for deliberation.” As the nature of war-
fare changed, however, most commentators
agree that “anticipatory self-defense” became
permissible. An aggressor’s army or rockets need
not cross a border before defensive force can be
used. It’s enough that an attack is imminent for
a state to defend itself. To do so, however, there
should be credible evidence that aggression is
indeed imminent, and that peaceful means of
settling the dispute have been exhausted. 
Let’s apply these measures of moral principle as
well as customary and statutory international
law to the U.S. war on Iraq. We’ll first examine
the motives for this war as expressed by the Bush
Administration (jus ad bellum), and then evalu-
ate the means (jus in bello).
The Motives: The Bush Doctrine
On the night of March 19, 2003, U.S. military
forces launched “Operation Iraqi Freedom” to
oust the regime of Saddam Hussein. Within two
weeks, what little resistance Iraqi soldiers offered
was suppressed, and U.S. troops occupied Bagh-
dad. During the months before the “shock and
awe” campaign, the Bush Administration pre-
sented its arguments for going to war: Iraq’s links
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to terrorists and its weapons of mass destruction,
particularly nuclear weapons. 
The war was based on a National Security Strat-
egy Doctrine issued September 2002 in response
to what President Bush called “a threat with no
precedent.” The Bush Doctrine expands the idea
of preemptive defense to deal with new threats of
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and
rogue states. This doctrine rejects deterrence
because “if we wait for threats to fully material-
ize, we will have waited too long. … We must
take the battle to the enemy … and confront the
worst threats before they emerge. In the world
we have entered, the only path to safety is the
path of action. And this nation will act.” (Presi-
dent George W. Bush, Speech at West Point,
June 1, 2002). 
To clarify this concept, William H. Taft IV, legal
adviser at the State Department, issued a state-
ment on January 13, 2003. A state’s “significant
military power…would not, in the absence of
any evidence that it intends to use its power
against others aggressively, justify a preemptive
strike against it … After the exhaustion of peace-
ful remedies, and after careful consideration of
the consequences, in the face of overwhelming
evidence of an imminent threat, … a nation may
take preemptive action to defend its nationals
from catastrophic harm.” 
Taft goes on to link the doctrine to principles of
customary international law. The United States
would exhaust “efforts to address the situation
by peaceful means, by diplomacy, and any other
way short of the use of force” before engaging in
preemptive war. The use of force would be lim-
ited, “sufficient to defend against the specific
threat.” Finally, the threat should be “imminent”
taking into account “the capacity of today’s
weapons, and also the tactics of those who may
hold them.”
This broadly expands the moral and legal princi-
ples of self-defense found in the United Nations
Charter, even the widely accepted notion of
anticipatory self-defense. If the United States
believes another country has the capability to
cause harm, preemptive war may be justified even
without a clear understanding of the other state’s
intent. Simply the possession of such harmful
weapons may be a reason for war. Thus, accord-
ing to the Bush Doctrine, war is permissible if:
1. the opponent possesses weapons of mass 
destruction;
2. the threat against our nationals is 
imminent; and 
3. peaceful remedies have been exhausted. 
Given these parameters, the war against Iraq
seems to have violated not only the U.N. Char-
ter, but the Bush Doctrine as well. While the
U.S. government claimed that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction, particularly
nuclear weapons that could threaten the U.S.
itself, such evidence has been illusive. In fact,
U.S. military forces were in no great hurry to
find these weapons—weeks after the end of hos-
tilities, the U.S. was still assembling a group of
specialists to search for them. 
If, as the Bush Administration claimed, Saddam
Hussein would have distributed weapons of mass
destruction to terrorists, why didn’t our forces
secure Iraq’s main nuclear waste site at the
Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, 11 miles
The use of armed force was governed by three principles: military
force necessary to subjugate an enemy is permissible (military
necessity); violence in excess of that is forbidden (humanity); and
its use should be conducted under a code of fairness (chivalry).
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south of Baghdad, where four thousand pounds
of partially enriched uranium and more than 94
tons of natural uranium as well as radioactive
strontium, cesium, and cobalt were stored? Yet
this site remained unguarded by U.S. troops for
days while looters entered the facility and carted
off much of the waste material. If we waged war
against Iraq to prevent weapons of mass destruc-
tion from falling into the hands of terrorists,
why didn’t the U.S. war plan have forces dedi-
cated to stop this possibility? Where is the evi-
dence that the Ba’ath regime, a secular dictator-
ship, supported al Qaeda terrorists, a militant,
radical Islamic Fundamentalist group whose goal
is the overthrow of all non-religious govern-
ments in the region? 
And why did we need to attack in the beginning
of March, when United Nations inspections were
still underway and peaceful remedies had not
been exhausted? These questions call into doubt
the motives of the Bush Administration and ren-
der the Bush Doctrine meaningless in providing
any guidelines limiting preemptive war. 
Can Saddam’s removal by force without broad
international support be justified as humanitari-
an intervention? Rarely, if ever, did administra-
tion spokespersons cite the need to rid Iraq of its
tyrant, Saddam Hussein, before launching the
war. Perhaps they recognized the hypocrisy of
declaring immoral a leader with whom both
Presidents Reagan and Bush (senior) cooperated
in the 1980s and early 1990s. Perhaps they
believed the American people would not support
regime change by force unless the vital security
of the U.S. was imminently threatened. 
Clearly the international community may act to
stop extraordinary acts such as genocide or eth-
nic cleansing. However, the use of force without
United Nations Security Council authorization
poses risks. It cloaks selectively applied military
action for narrow self-interest as humanitarian
intervention. It undermines fragile norms for the
peaceful settlement of disputes. More worri-
some, such intervention sets precedents for other
states that seek unilaterally to change regimes,
inviting unilateral attacks and unhinging the sta-
bility of the international system. Is there pro-
portionality between the objects sought through
war, Saddam’s removal, and the destruction it
may cause the international community and the
people of Iraq? Time will tell.
The Means: Rumsfeld’s 
Lean, Hi-Tech Machine
Donald Rumsfeld assumed office January 20,
2001, with a vision for the future of U.S.
strategy. His earlier experience as Defense Secre-
tary   in the 1970s taught him that U.S. strategic
policy needed rethinking and reorganization.
This country’s reliance on strategic nuclear
weapons and its focus on Cold War deterrence
were outdated, and Rumsfeld had a plan: faster
forces with lighter equipment that could be
rapidly airlifted into battle. “Speed matters,” said
one of the Secretary’s assistants. “Speed kills.
It leads to less collateral damage and fewer U.S.
casualties.” Coupled with better communica-
tion, information technology, and surveillance,
the U.S. military developed what another
advisor called “an unblinking eye over the battle
space.” 
Rumsfeld’s new doctrine was tested during the
war against Iraq. The troops deployed were as
few in number as possible, permitting a quicker
build up and giving Saddam Hussein less time to
react with chemical weapons, oil well sabotage,
or massive fortifications. In fact, the ground
force of 125,000 that subjugated organized Iraqi
resistance in two weeks was only half the size of
the army that fought the first Gulf War. This
force was even smaller than planned. Turkey
denied the U.S. request for transit of military
Is there proportionality between the objects sought through war,
Saddam’s removal, and the destruction it may cause the inter-
national community and the people of Iraq? Time will tell.
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forces, and Secretary Rumsfeld elected to start
the war three weeks early with only one heavy
division in place rather than two. The result was
spectacular, according to Bush Administration
officials. Before the war ended, Vice President
Dick Cheney claimed that Iraq was “proof posi-
tive of the success of our efforts to transform our
military.”
Indeed, the use of this lean, quick, hi-tech mili-
tary force limited battlefield casualties. By May
1, 2003, when President Bush declared “an end
of major combat in Iraq,” the U.S. military had
fewer than 130 dead, with a relatively small
number wounded. Iraqi casualties are more dif-
ficult to calculate, but before its collapse, the
Iraqi government claimed 2,252 civilians killed
with 5,103 injured. 
Any casualty of war is regrettable, of course,
especially those inflicted on civilian non-
combatants. Yet these figures are considerably
lower than similar past conflicts. Proponents of
the Rumsfeld Doctrine point to quick, light U.S.
forces that produced rapid subjugation of Iraqi
troops, precision munitions, real-time intelli-
gence, and secure communication as reasons for
relatively low number of casualties.
This same aspect of the Rumsfeld Doctrine—the
use of small numbers of troops to conduct mili-
tary operations—has unforeseen consequences,
however: “blowback” effects that continue to
haunt the U.S. occupation of Iraq. The first is a
failure to provide public safety for the Iraqi pop-
ulation. Under the Doctrine of Just War (jus in
bello), a conquering military force has a respon-
sibility to provide public order in the territories
occupied during warfare. This moral duty has
been codified in Article 43 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations as well as Article 27 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention and articles 72-77 of its
1977 Protocol Relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of International Armed Conflict. The U.S.
has signed and ratified the Hague and Geneva
conventions, and treats most principles in the
1977 Protocol as customary international law.
According to the Hague Regulations, an occupy-
ing force “shall take all measures in his power to
restore and insure, as far as possible, public order
and safety.”
The U.S. did not fulfill this obligation in Iraq,
and continued failure to do so borders on crim-
inal negligence. Rape and violent crime are still
widespread. Much of the country has been rav-
aged by looters and armed thugs while citizens
hide in their homes. While criminals looted,
burned, and destroyed government buildings
and schools, occupying troops did little to stop
them, fearing their numbers were too few to
provide police protection. As looters stole Iraq’s
cultural treasures from the National Museum,
American soldiers turned away, guarding instead
the Ministry of Oil. The responsibility for filling
any vacuum of authority is a responsibility of the
occupying power, yet no pre-operational
rehearsal for this kind of peacekeeping was con-
ducted by U.S. forces.
The occupying power also has a moral and legal
obligation to ensure that medical services work
properly. Based on the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, the occupying force has a legal obligation
for “ensuring and maintaining, with the cooper-
ation of national and local authorities, the med-
ical and hospital establishments and services,
public health, and hygiene in the occupied terri-
tories.” 
Little thought seems to have been given to this
responsibility before, during, and immediately
after the war. Coalition forces failed to protect
hospitals, leaving them vulnerable to looters who
stripped them of medical supplies, even dragging
oxygen tanks away from needy patients. Looters
took nuclear waste products from storage facili-
ties near Baghdad previously known to U.S.
intelligence officials. These contained radioac-
tive materials that could contaminate a large
area. Water, sanitation, and electrical services
remain interrupted. Doctors Without Borders
reports individuals suffering from chronic condi-
tions such as diabetes, kidney disease, and
epilepsy due to inadequate medication, and life
threatening diseases such as tuberculosis and
kala-azar, a fly-borne sickness, go untreated due
to lack of medicine. The World Health Organi-
zation feared cholera outbreaks in southern Iraq
due to poor sanitation, and the International
Red Cross pleaded with U.S. military officers to
take charge of hospitals, pay the staff, and get
essential services running again.
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These problems in public safety and health are a
result of poor planning, inadequate resources,
and the limited number of coalition forces avail-
able to provide order and care to innocents
caught up in the unanticipated results of armed
conflict. The Rumsfeld Doctrine may provide the
U.S. with a quick and relatively painless means to
use armed force for settling political problems,
but it seems to care little for the civilians caught
in the wake of “shock and awe” violence.
Conclusion
I now understand more clearly why the Jordan-
ian official who talked with me thought that
9/11 “changes everything.” That tragic event has
made the U.S. government turn its back on
nearly five hundred years of international law
and moral norms that made the use of force
legally and morally permissible for self-defense
only, after all other means have been exhausted. 
Earlier presidents have deceived the American
public about using armed force. Johnson misled
us into war in Viet Nam, and Nixon into the
massive bombing of Cambodia and Hanoi. Rea-
gan and Bush distorted the threat of commu-
nism in Central America to justify intervention
in the name of self-defense. Clinton vilified the
Serbs, ignoring Muslim and Croatian atrocities
to claim that NATO intervention in the former
Yugoslavia was morally and legally justified.
What changed after 9/11, however, is this
administration’s attitude that international law
and moral norms no longer matter. The U.S.
now ignores them simply because we’ve been
attacked by terrorists.
This government may now use armed interven-
tion when any opponent—state or terrorist
group—might possess weapons of mass destruc-
tion, even without evidence. Its forces can strike
when such an entity threatens our nationals—
individual or corporate—anywhere in the world.
It can launch preemptive war when our govern-
ment has exhausted its own patience in seeking
peaceful remedies, whether such attempts are
working or not. The result is an agile, imperial
giant, willing to take on any state or organization
with which it is displeased, regardless of the con-
sequences to international peace, stability, and
the well-being of civilians in occupied areas. 
Imagine you are a strategic adviser to the govern-
ment of North Korea, Libya, Syria, or Iran with
their values, perceptions, and national interests.
Would you counsel surrender to American hege-
mony? Or would you advise the acquisition of
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass
destruction to dissuade U.S. domination and
deter preemptive war? Given states’ historic drive
toward self preservation, their leaders might
choose unconventional means to assure their sur-
vival. If they do, the Bush and Rumsfeld Doc-
trines may become “a more clear and present
danger” to the U.S. and to the world than the ter-
rorism they seek to defeat.
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IS IT POSSIBLE TO MOVE 
FROM FEAR TO FREEDOM?
Terrorism and the threat of terrorism have irrev-
ocably altered our lives. The grief, shock, and
anger experienced by many Americans in the
aftermath of 9/11 have abated somewhat, only
to be replaced by a seemingly permanent sense of
unease and fear. In two short years, mainstream
national consciousness has weathered an attitu-
dinal transformation from “We are no longer
safe” to “How could we ever have thought oth-
erwise?” As we consider our nation’s role in
world events, we should not ignore the complex
effects of national and international counterter-
rorist responses on people beyond our borders;
as we consider our evolution as a constitutional
democracy, we should be equally vigilant about
the impact of counterterrorist measures on
domestic civil liberties.
Civil liberties matter in a post-9/11 world because
they enable us to move from fear to freedom; they
give us both the ethical space and the analytical
tools to balance the goals of liberty and security. 
CHECKS AND BALANCES: 
STRUCTURAL NECESSITIES TO
PRESERVE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Before 9/11, discussions about the need for gov-
ernmental checks and balances perhaps carried a
whiff of the academic and theoretical; now, how-
ever, they can be firmly rooted in urgent, ongo-
ing examples of constitutional challenges. The
principle underlying the separation of powers
among three branches—the legislature, the
executive, and the judiciary—is that a delicate
balance ensures responsibility, accountability,
and oversight. Yet, since 9/11 each of these goals
has been undermined. 
BY  M A R G A R E T  M .  R U S S E L L
Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law
Civil Liberties in the U.S.:
WHY THEY MATTER IN A POST-9/11 WORLD
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Legislative Responsibility. In recent years, legit-
imate concerns about national security and ter-
rorist threats have led to illegitimate exercises of
Congressional authority. Unfortunately, such
overreaching can sacrifice the preservation of
individual liberties in favor of the broad abdica-
tion of authority to the executive branch and an
accompanying curtailment of opportunities for
independent judicial review of executive branch
actions. 
The USA Patriot Act, passed by Congress and
signed into law by the President six weeks after
9/11, is a prime example of why we need checks
and balances to preserve individual rights in per-
ilous and fearful times. Understandably, a perva-
sive sense of urgency fueled the government’s
determination to act quickly and decisively to
combat terrorism. Unfortunately, many of the
USA Patriot Act’s provisions are simply bad law;
they broadly curtail constitutional freedoms
with no promise or measures of effectiveness.
Particularly at risk are rights guaranteed under
the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments
of the Bill of Rights.
The most controversial provision to date is Sec-
tion 215, which permits the federal government
easily to obtain a judicial order granting it access
to records on clients or customers from libraries,
bookstores, doctors, universities, internet service
providers, and other public and private entities.
This section also prohibits an organization
forced to turn over records from disclosing the
very existence of the search to their clients, cus-
tomers, or anyone else. Widely criticized for its
overly broad sweep and concomitant threats for
freedom of expression, Section 215 is being chal-
lenged in court and in Congressional efforts for
its repeal. The Justice Department denies that
this provision is being used in an unconstitu-
tional manner, but it is the structural deficiency
of this mechanism that causes the greatest con-
stitutional concerns.
Executive Accountability. A systemic problem of
the USA Patriot Act is its excessive concentration
of counterterrorist powers in the executive
branch, with few safeguards ensuring any mean-
ingful kind of public accountability. In addition
to Section 215, other provisions permit the exec-
utive branch, with minimal judicial review, to:
conduct electronic surveillance of private inter-
net communications, gain access to student
records, and authorize detention of non-citizens
and citizens. In proposed new legislation, the
Domestic Security Enhancement Act (nick-
named “Patriot II”), executive branch powers
would be extended even further to include: the
right to obtain credit and library records without
obtaining any judicially approved warrant, and
the right to prevent disclosure of the identity of
any detainee until criminal charges are filed—
even if the detainee is a U.S. citizen and even if
the detention is of long duration. 
In addition to the USA Patriot Act and “Patriot
II,” the Justice Department increasingly relies
upon Presidential orders and Attorney General
directives to buttress law enforcement powers
with no opportunity for public debate. Certainly,
in any valid counterterrorist efforts, law enforce-
ment powers and executive branch authority
must be strong. However, we should also be
mindful of the pitfalls: government suppression
of dissent in our recent history includes the
Palmer Raids of the 1920s, the “Red Scare” of
the 1940s and 1950s, and FBI surveillance
of anti-war and civil rights protesters of the
1960s. Internment of United States citizens of
Japanese descent was sanctioned through execu-
tive orders and U.S. Supreme Court case law.
History has taught us that without measured,
rigorous standards of transparency and account-
ability, the President, Attorney General, FBI,
and CIA can trample upon the very freedoms
of expression and association that they purport
to protect. 
The USA Patriot Act, passed by Congress and signed into law by the President six weeks after
9/11, is a prime example of why we need checks and balances to preserve individual rights in
perilous and fearful times.
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Independent Judicial Review. The challenge of
preserving a searching, vigorous role for judicial
review is hardly new. In introducing the Bill of
Rights in the first Congress, James Madison
noted:
Independent tribunals of justice will con-
sider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every
assumption of power in the legislative or
executive; they will be naturally led to resist
every encroachment upon rights expressly
stipulated for in the Constitution by the
Declaration of Rights.
Similarly, in Federalist No. 78, Alexander
Hamilton described the role of an independent
judiciary as follows: “In a monarchy, it is an
excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince;
in a republic, it is a no less excellent barrier to the
encroachments and oppressions of the represen-
tative body.”
What is new—or, at least, disturbingly different
in a post-9/11 world—is the tremendous pres-
sure to take constitutional “shortcuts” by
restricting judicial review when it seems time-
consuming, onerous, or, worse yet, when it
might yield a result contrary to government
objectives. As mentioned above, several provi-
sions of the USA Patriot Act minimize the role
of judicial review. This trend reached full force in
several statutes passed in the mid-1990s: the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act. These laws, promoted as a part of
movement to “streamline” prosecutions, contain
explicit “court-stripping” provisions that expe-
dite prosecutions by eliminating the role of an
independent judiciary. Yet, constitutional history
underscores the need for court review as the only
possible avenue for dispassionate, nonpartisan
balance. The judicial branch would have little
meaning if the President and Congressional
majorities—of any era—could bring about laws
that simultaneously abrogate individual liberties
and deny individuals the opportunities to bring
court challenges to those laws. 
PRESERVING SECURITY 
AND FREEDOM
Increasingly, concerns about the infringement of
individual rights transcend stereotypical assump-
tions about “liberal vs. conservative” ideologies.
People concerned about national security in the
preservation of a democracy are concerned as
well about the values of openness and account-
ability that are necessary characteristics of a con-
stitutional democracy. In a bipartisan report
issued in February 2003 by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, members criticized the Justice
Department and the FBI for their failure to sub-
mit to congressional oversight. As of September
2003, over 140 governments, including three
states, have passed resolutions opposed to the
USA Patriot Act’s infringements on civil liber-
ties. In August 2003, the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives produced a strong vote forbidding the
Justice Department from spending funds to
carry out the Patriot Act’s controversial “sneak
and peek” provision, which authorizes federal
agents to conduct secret searches of homes and
businesses.
As we move from fear to freedom, we can be
guided by the principles of the Bill of Rights. As
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson
wrote: 
The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was
to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials, and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by courts.
Yes, the post-9/11 world is tragically, irreversibly
changed. But our principles of freedom and
equality need not be.
Margaret M. Russell
Professor,  
Santa Clara University
School of Law
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The history of modern Iraq has been shaped by three political-economic factors:international trade in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, a territorial bufferagainst Russian expansion, and the development of the petroleum industry. The
United Kingdom, France and, later in the 20th century, the United States of America
became absorbed by protecting and/or controlling western Asia and northern Africa.
Beginning in World War II, the region has developed as one of the most significant foci
of U.S. foreign policy, and every presidential administration from 1944 to the present has
been directly involved in shaping economic and political conditions there. Lest Republi-
cans feel unjustly attacked in the current circumstances, it should be pointed out that the
policy of U.S. expansionism in west Asia was formulated by George W. Kennan during
the administrations of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. President Dwight Eisen-
hower sent troops to Lebanon to assist the British in efforts to oppose a military coup
d’etat in Iraq in 1958, and every subsequent administration was directly involved in the
economic and political affairs of several countries, including Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, and Iran, the latter three among the most significant suppliers of petroleum. It was
openly accepted policy that military intervention would be used if U.S. national interests
were threatened. 
BY  D A V I D  E .  S K I N N E R
Professor, Department of History, Santa Clara University
The 
Consequences 
of War: 
Iraq, 
a Case Study
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After Saddam Hussein became dictator of Iraq in
a “palace coup” in 1979 and invaded Iran, U.S.
policy tilted toward Iraq in an effort to under-
mine the Khomeini regime in Iran, and through-
out the 1980s, the U.S. played a balancing game
so that neither Iraq nor Iran would emerge as
victors. A primary consequence of the war was
that both countries were economically devastated,
but the U.S. and several other nations in NATO
continued to give support to the Hussein dicta-
torship until Iraq occupied Kuwait in 1990.
Even then the official U.S. policy was to control,
rather than destroy, the Hussein regime. The
U.S. thrust toward Baghdad was halted, and
uprisings by the Kurds in the north and shi’ah
forces in the south were not given support. After
1991 a war of attrition through United Nations
inspections, international sanctions, and periodic
bombing by the U.S. kept Iraq militarily weak
and economically devastated. However, some
members of the first Bush administration,
notably Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz, were
strong advocates of removing Saddam Hussein.
In 1992 Wolfowitz prepared a study for Cheney
in which he outlined the fundamental reasons
for invading Iraq and reshaping its political and
economic institutions. Securing access to Iraq’s
petroleum reserves was given as an important
reason for intervention.1 Indeed, plans for inva-
sion continued to be formulated during the
Clinton administration and bombing in the
“no-fly zones” intensified from time to time.
However, it was the formation of the second
Bush administration with Dick Cheney as vice
president and Paul Wolfowitz as assistant secre-
tary of defense, together with the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, that set in
motion the already prepared plans for invasion.
Bombing was intensified during summer 2002
to destroy air defenses and military installations,
and the final preparations for invasion were made
that September. The return of U.N. weapons
inspectors, supported by several members of the
Security Council and other U.N. members, was
essentially a sideshow that produced a massive
propaganda barrage by the U.K. and U.S.
administrations.
Were there weapons of mass destruction? Evi-
dently not, at least not in significant amounts
and not ready to be used in battle, as indicated
in the UN inspectors’ reports.2 Was Iraq an
imminent threat to the United States or to coun-
tries in the region? Based on the types of main-
force military resistance to the invasion one must
conclude that Iraq was poorly prepared to wage
war, and immediate neighbors such as Iran,
Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia
expressed no fear of attack and (except for Jor-
dan) did not support the U.S. invasion. Did Iraq
support al Qaeda or similar militant Muslim
organizations? Here the evidence clearly indi-
cates that Saddam Hussein, a secular socialist,
was considered an enemy of Islam by these
groups, and their intention was to subvert and
destroy his regime.3 This the U.K. and the U.S.
Were there weapons of mass destruction? Evidently not, at least not in significant 
amounts and not ready to be used in battle, as indicated in the UN inspectors’ reports.2
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did accomplish, and they are now an occupying
force held responsible for their actions by inter-
national law. At this point we arrive at the cen-
tral theme of our analysis. Wars have intended,
foreseeable, unintended, and unforeseeable con-
sequences. Certainly, they are violent and intend
to destroy infrastructure, people, and institu-
tions, but—no matter how many “smart” bombs
or missiles are used—the amount of destruction
and the consequences of that destruction are not
foreseeable. Human beings are not always smart
or insightful, and passion overwhelms reason.
Just because Donald Rumsfeld appears cool and
collected on television does not make him a rea-
sonable person.
The widespread perception by West Asians,
based on previous United States activities in the
region and based on the 2003 invasion and its
aftermath, is that these actions are driven solely
by self-interest and imperialist goals. Americans
have the unfortunate opinion that we are well
informed and “foreigners” are poorly informed. I
have done considerable research in villages in
West Africa and have discovered that their resi-
dents are often better informed about world
affairs than many of the students in my courses.
The U.S. tendency to support corrupt dictators
and suppress popular, nationalist movements—
as in the overthrow of prime minister Mossadeq
and the reinstatement of the Shah in Iran in
1954—has devalued U.S. political currency in
the region. When the U.S. failed to gain any
substantial support for an invasion and had no
credible plan for post-invasion administration
and security, perceptions of self-interest, arro-
gance, and imperialism were reinforced. Arabs
have a realistic and detailed view of the war and
the postwar period through regional television,
radio, and Internet sites. They know about the
U.S. use of weapons of mass destruction, the tar-
geting of civilian infrastructure and residential
areas, the lack of interest in the number of civil-
ian deaths and injuries,4 poor postwar security
and slow reconstruction,5 the awarding of lucra-
tive contracts to politically connected U.S. cor-
porations, and the creation of prison camps to
house, interrogate, and mistreat Iraqis swept up
in raids or who were going about their daily
business. These developments have produced
widespread anger, resentment, resistance, and
rebellion in many areas of central and southern
Iraq. In part this accounts for the random and
organized attacks on British and American
troops, on Iraqis who cooperate with the mili-
tary administration, and on public facilities. An
ironic and unintended consequence of the war
has been an influx of fighters from militant orga-
nizations who use terrorist tactics to oppose the
occupation.6
George W. Bush declared on May 1 that major
combat had ended. Most Iraqis were expected to
welcome their liberation, political stability and
democracy would be promoted in West Asia, and
the war against terrorism would be enhanced.
None of these projections are proving to be true.
The Syrian government has been affronted by
U.S. accusations of development of weapons of
mass destruction and harboring Baath leaders,
Turkey is concerned about the creation of a Kur-
dish state in the north, Iran and many European
states are angry about the soft treatment of
mujahideen al-khalq, an Iraq-based terrorist
organization dedicated to the overthrow of a
democratically elected government. A significant
consequence of the war is the development of
well-organized shi’ah opposition groups who had
been suppressed under Saddam Hussein’s dicta-
torship. The shi’ah comprise more than 60 per-
cent of Iraq’s total population and are led by
three prominent families who are planning to
rejuvenate educational and religious centers and
to promote Islamic based political institutions.
On a global scale there has been no diminution
of terrorism. There exist dozens of “al-qaeda,”
small, efficient and dedicated organizations that
feed on the conditions created by the U.K. and
Wars have intended, foreseeable, unintended, and unforeseeable consequences.
Certainly, they are violent and intend to destroy infrastructure, people, and institutions,
but—no matter how many “smart” bombs or missiles are used—the amount of destruction 
and the consequences of that destruction are not foreseeable.
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the U.S. in Iraq. In addition, the U.S. economy
has been compromised by the cost of the war,7
global economic recovery has been retarded, and
U.S. relations with the European Union, Russia,
China, India, and many important countries in
the “Third World Bloc” have been undermined.
In an era of so-called globalization the invasion
and its postwar developments have produced
serious reservations about U.S. motives and
plans for future operations. True globalization
only will develop through mutual respect for
cultural values, institutions, and philosophies
and by creating cooperative programs that bene-
fit all societies.
I will conclude this article with a statement by
Dwight David Eisenhower in 1953:
Every gun that is made, every warship
launched, every rocket fired, signifies in
the final sense a theft from those who
hunger and are not fed, those who are
cold and are not clothed.8
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Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired,
signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those 
who are cold and are not clothed.8
—DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER
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Editor’s Note: This conversation took place on June
2, 2003. What follows is an edited version of the
transcript.
SPOHN: Until about a year ago the predomi-
nant post-WWII strategy for the U.S. was con-
tainment and deterrence, which were the two
pillars of American foreign policy during the
whole Cold War. Now, the new U.S. strategic
document that came out last fall essentially says
that the U.S., as the only superpower in the
world, has a special responsibility and that it can
act unilaterally and even preemptively to prevent
attacks on its interests. One could say that the
Iraq war was the beginning of this. Has the war
on terror changed the official rules of the game?
What are the moral implications of that change
of strategic posture?
MEYER: I think unilateralism is a vice because
it does not allow for building community.
Assuming that a global community represents
international concern for human rights and
other reasonable goals, you just can’t build those
things unilaterally. Is an imperial U.S. ruling
the world a good thing or a bad thing? I think it
is pretty clearly a bad thing if you are trying to
form certain kinds of communities. You don’t
build a community from the top down. Com-
munities require genuine engagement with oth-
ers. Yet that is not the way unilateralism works. 
RAVIZZA: I think it is important to see that the
National Security Strategy of 2002 has seeds that
go back at least ten years to the Defense Plan-
ning Guidance that Paul Wolfowitz took the
lead drafting in 1992. That draft put forth many
of the concepts that are now contained in the
Bush Doctrine. In particular, it argued that with
the end of the Cold War, a policy of contain-
ment was outdated, and it stated that the U.S.
should now be willing to take preemptive action
to protect itself and maintain its status as the
sole, dominant world power. The draft of the
Planning Guidance was leaked to the New York
Times and the Washington Post, and there was
such an outcry that President Bush backed away
from it. But Wolfowitz and company continued
to promote this new approach to foreign policy.
When you see many of their ideas finally adopted
ten years later in the National Security Strategy
of 2002, you realize that really this is a doctrine
that has been in search of a justification. And the
justification was Sept. 11.
SPOHN: Why is that doctrine morally suspect?
Someone could say, “We have been good guys in
the world. The American dream is the best thing
that could happen in the world.”
War and
Peace
in the 21st Century
A DIALOG:
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RAVIZZA: The problem for me is posed by the
Just War theory as it comes out of the Christian
Tradition. Within that tradition there has always
been a regulative ideal of non-violence. Accord-
ing to this tradition, violence should be a last
resort and should only be used as a defense
against aggression. To paraphrase Augustine, war
is always at best a tragic necessity.
In contrast, what we now see is a willingness to
use violence not just as a response to aggression,
but as a means to prevent aggression. The idea is
that because terrorists are now operating in
secret and we cannot see them amassing forces
on our borders, it is necessary to loosen the tra-
ditional constraints of Just War theory. Accord-
ing to the Bush Doctrine, violence may be used
not simply to respond to actual attacks, but even
to prevent possible ones.
DECOSSE: I think the question of violence
itself is an important aspect of our discussion.
For instance, the Vatican has increasingly said
that war is always a failure, although they have
said this while continuing to affirm, in some
instances, the validity of Just War theory. An
important part of the Vatican’s judgment that
war is always a failure is a judgment about the
destructive—both physically and morally—
nature of violence itself. What does violence do
to the person who carries it out? What does it do
to the person on the receiving end? Is violence
itself a neutral moral or philosophical category? I
was looking at some work by James Turner John-
son, an important just war theorist. He speaks of
violence in a much more morally neutral way
than does the Vatican.
CURRY: The strategy of preemption or preven-
tion clearly fits this historical period when the
U.S. has won the Cold War without really doing
anything. It has seemed, as a result, that our val-
ues are the best. Our interest in prevention is
ironic, because what we are really looking at is
the first time that human rights have been a jus-
tification for war, but we claim the right to judge
others. The U.S. wants to impose our definition
of human rights. Our definition includes some
of the rights that we don’t live up to. If you
impose them from outside, it is very difficult to
get people to observe them. So we are not creat-
ing a world culture of human rights. Violence
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becomes the way to impose human rights or
human rights violations become justifications
for violence. 
SPOHN: The Just War theory is prefaced on
sovereign states that are in dispute, who have
assets, who have armies, and who have identifi-
able territory. Now we are dealing with these
so-called non-state actors who don’t have
territory, who don’t have identifiable assets, for
the most part, and who have not affirmed any
sort of international agreement, for example, the
Geneva Convention. Has the international order
slipped from a relatively regulated framework
of the Cold War back into a kind of Hobbesean
“state of nature”1 where it is a
war of all against all and there
really are no rules? 
RAVIZZA: President Bush
has defined this war as a war
against evil, and in particular
against terrorism that can take
a variety of shapes. Our ene-
mies are not only terrorists
but also any nation that har-
bors terrorists. This claim
allows us, potentially, to
expand the war in all sorts of
ways. But are we expanding it
in ways that are responding to
actual threats against our
national security? Or, are we
expanding it in ways that pro-
mote our own self-interest?
These are two very different questions. The 2002
National Strategy document makes it quite clear
that U.S. is the sole judge of the legitimacy of its
use of preemptive force. Yet isn’t it morally dan-
gerous to deny that a neutral, multinational
source could help judge whether a preemptive
use of power is appropriate? One of the things
we have learned is that power corrupts and
absolute power corrupts absolutely. If we say that
as the dominant world power we are the only
ones who can judge our own use of preemptive
force, then are we setting ourselves up for a ter-
rible moral tragedy?
DECOSSE: I think the national security strategy
is, in effect, a doctrine in search of a cause.
Among other weaknesses of the document, I
think its assertion that rogue states and terrorism
are pretty much the same issue is not in fact
correct. Just War criteria apply differently to the
pursuit of al Qaeda than to the situations with
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Part of the problem
here is the “over-moralization” behind the Bush
policy. Under the influence of the false certainty
behind the language of evil, some important
rational distinctions have been lost about how
Just War criteria are to be applied and about the
need for evidence to justify military action.
SPOHN: I think the people who authored that
’92 document were full of regret that they didn’t
finish off Sadaam. And, I
think there are ways in which
this second Gulf War was the
unfinished business of the first
Bush administration by the
same foreign policy team.
RAVIZZA: Let me try to take
their side for a moment. I
think they felt that we had
been constrained in that first
Gulf War by an outdated Just
War theory, and so we decided
not to go to Baghdad and not
to remove Sadaam Hussein.
But some in the Bush Admin-
istration feel that this decision
was a mistake, and that we are
still living with the difficult
aftermath of this mistake. The
inability of the U.N. to enforce weapons inspec-
tions in Iraq has simply fed this sentiment, and
led people to doubt whether multinational orga-
nizations like the U.N. can be effective.
CURRY: But we haven’t found any weapons of
mass destruction, which would suggest that what
the U.N. was doing likely had some effect. 
SPOHN: From 1989 to 2002 there was a 13-
year window when both the first Bush adminis-
tration and the Clinton administration voluntar-
ily pursued multilateralism. And now with glob-
alization, the reality of American military power
makes voluntary multilateralism superfluous.
Next year we will spend more on our military
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Has the international
order slipped from a
relatively regulated
framework of the Cold
War back into a kind
of Hobbesean “state
of nature”1 where it is
a war of all against all
and there really are no
rules?
—WILLIAM SPOHN
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budget than the rest of the world put together—
$400 billion. There is no one to challenge us.
RAVIZZA: The economics raise a moral ques-
tion. And our commitment to military spending
is not a new trend. In 2002, the U.S. and its
allies spent $548 billion on their military bud-
get. In comparison, the “Axis of Evil” spent $12
billion; China spent $42 billion; and Russia
spent $60 billion. Even adding these latter three
budgets together, the U.S. and its allies still were
spending $434 billion more on defense. Is that
really necessary? If you look at our own federal
budget in 2002, we were spending $343 billion
on the military. In contrast, $39 billion was
allotted for children’s health,
$34 billion for K–12 educa-
tion, $6 billion for Head
Start, and $1 billion for world
hunger. That means we were
spending $263 billion more
on defense than on all these
other programs. So the price
of this kind of military domi-
nance is steep. And the dollars
that we spend to be the dom-
inant world power are dollars
that we are not spending on
other needs at home and
abroad.
SPOHN: So what moral
guidelines from the Just War
theory apply in the war on
terrorism? Are there canons of
Just War that ought to be observed as ways of
limiting the resort to violence and the damage of
violence even in a war on terror?
MEYER: I don’t see why “last resort” and “pro-
portionality” don’t still have a lot of relevance.
It seems to me you don’t go out and kill people,
including completely innocent civilians, unless
it is the very last thing that you need to do to
protect yourself. And then you have got to have
a sophisticated sense of what counts as protect-
ing yourself. Not looking at the unintended
but predictable consequences of this kind of
unilateral violence in terms of al Qaeda recruit-
ment or other kinds of nefarious activities is
insane. 
CURRY: I am not an ethicist or a theologian but
it seems to me on a practical basis those consider-
ations are difficult when you are looking at a
nation-state versus an enemy you cannot see or
define. We have managed to embody the whole
enemy as Sadaam Hussein or Osama bin Laden.
But there are lots of people involved, and our
actions in many military and non-military con-
flicts encourage, justify, or trigger their violence.
DECOSSE: There is a disconnect when I think
of 9/11, because preemptive military action
would not have stopped it. In using the Just War
theory in light of terrorism, we would militarize
the response way too much. The people who are
aligned with the Bush Admin-
istration want to greatly
restrict Just War criteria to
“just cause,” “right intention,”
and “legitimate authority.”
And, they stop right there.
That obviously would permit
the use of violence to a far
greater degree.
RAVIZZA: It is essential to
appreciate that the rules for
Just War cannot be under-
stood apart from the interpre-
tive tradition of the people
who are applying those rules.
Let me contrast two such
interpretive traditions. On the
one hand, you have a Christ-
ian tradition out of which
thinkers like Augustine and Aquinas developed
Just War thinking. In that tradition there is a
regulative ideal of non-violence based on the
command to love your enemy and your neigh-
bor as yourself. This law of love is the presumed
starting point of any deliberation. If you are
applying Just War theory out of this kind of
interpretive tradition, the assumption is that any
use of violence is a tragedy. And when you eval-
uate something like “proportionality,” you are
not simply considering what is going to be the
proportion of good to evil in a particular act of
violence, you must take into account the whole
aftermath of war. If we apply this to the current
conflict in Iraq, we should not simply ask, “Do
we have some narrow justification for using vio-
The price of this kind
of military dominance
is steep. And the 
dollars that we spend
to be the dominant
world power are 
dollars that we are 
not spending on other
needs at home and
abroad.
—MARK RAVIZZA
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lence in this region to protect our national inter-
ests?” We also have to ask, “Will our interven-
tion ultimately lead to a just peace in the area for
all people?” 
This Christian tradition, with its presumption
against violence, is very different from an inter-
pretive tradition based on a Hobbesean “state of
nature” and the kind of political realism that sees
each nation struggling against others to promote
its own self interest. In a Hobbesean framework
it is more natural to view violence as an accept-
able tool to advance national goals. From this
starting point, it is not so objectionable to ask
“How might the use of preemptive force advance
my own nation’s power and
advantage?” In this context,
Just War theory can simply
become a rhetorical tool
deployed to justify a use of
violence already decided upon.
SPOHN: So even though a
given administration might
invoke the language of Just
War—“last resort,” “just cause,”
“fair hope of success,” and “pro-
portionality”—the danger is
that interpretive framework
within which they are operat-
ing could mean something
very different. Political realists
like Cheney, Wolfowitz,
Rumsfeld, Armitage, and oth-
ers are going to have a very
different framework than people like Jimmy
Carter or others in public life, maybe even Tony
Blair, so using the same words is a problem.
RAVIZZA: They could use Christian language
and they could use Just War principles. But if
they are operating out of that Hobbesean con-
tractarian point of view, they may be simply try-
ing to promote their national interests. 
MEYER: May I follow up on that? Mark made a
connection that I think is crucial between a Just
War and a just peace. And I think there is a ten-
dency to talk about Just War theory and not look
at a broader set of questions than the questions
of war; we need to consider questions of peace. 
If you were to take a small percentage of those
hundreds of billions the U.S. spends on defense
and spend it to improve the lives of people all
over the world, would we win friends or what?
Now I am not saying that makes ideological dif-
ferences go away. I am not saying that makes
radical Islam disappear. But I really do think
that the degree to which, and the ways in which,
and reasons for which people are attracted to
radical Islam, or are attracted to anti-U.S./anti-
western value systems is a function of a whole
bunch of unintended effects of things that we
do. Foreign aid cannot be all about guns, which
it largely is. 
CURRY: I think the other
problem is that, in claiming to
attempt to force democracy on
other countries, we are not very
democratic about doing it and
we don’t protect democracy in
our own country. We are not
really thinking about other
civilizations having other ways
to rule themselves that are
equally acceptable. The Amer-
ican system in our equation is
the best, or sometimes, only
acceptable one. 
SPOHN: Let me raise anoth-
er topic that is  related to this.
To what extent is there a
moral responsibility for one
nation to intervene in the
internal affairs of a sovereign state? There is an
increasing sense that if there are profound inter-
nal human rights violations, there is a responsi-
bility of the international community to do
something. The Treaty of Westphalia after
Europe’s wars of religion was founded on the
integrity of the nation-state. What happens
when that integrity is no longer seen as a limit
for military action from the outside?
CURRY: That assumes that states are made from
the inside out. The treaty of Westphalia was very
much about self-established states and states that
were communities of people who came together
as they did in Germany. Yugoslavia, Africa, and
many of the countries in Asia are artificial cre-
If you were to take 
a small percentage 
of those hundreds 
of billions the U.S.
spends on defense and
spend it to improve
the lives of people all
over the world, would
we win friends or
what? 
—MIKE MEYER
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ations. External powers drew somebody else’s
boundaries based on nothing that had to do with
the people there. So we created this problem, in
many ways, from the outside by dividing up the
world our own way. 
I think we focus so much on economic global-
ization that we have forgotten that the most
remarkable transformation is that it is now the
world’s or the United States’ business to judge
how governments govern—and to go in to
change how they deal within their own borders
with their own populations. This is really the
most important part about globalization. All of a
sudden we have a universalization of human
rights. The irony is that we are reluctant to let
other people make their own judgments when it
is inconvenient for us. You demand free elections
and that others allow sovereignty and freedom of
religion, all of which are guaranteed by interna-
tional accords. Then if a Muslim government
wins in a free election in Iraq, oh well, we say
that would not be acceptable.
DECOSSE: Humanitarian intervention is actu-
ally a good development in some ways. I think of
this in terms of the build up domestically to the
war in Iraq and the evidence of widespread vio-
lation of human rights there. In that sense it is a
good thing that we are not regarding national
borders per se as the be-all and end-all of deter-
mining possibilities for intervention.
MEYER: It opens up questions about whether
or not there is a “there” there. In Iraq clearly
there is no nation. The state is a completely
artificial construct. We drew state boundaries
after WWI in the Middle East and they are
completely out of whack with the cultural and
historical traditions of that place. We have to
be able to intervene in cases of severe injustice.
But the nature of the intervention and this idea
of nation building still strike me as genuinely
problematic. 
CURRY: The real issue is how do you create a
just peace. And how do you create peace in such
a way that will not create another war? What we
have seen in Yugoslavia was that the peace that
was forced on them had nothing to do with
resolving the issues that had created the first con-
flict. And so those conflicts were replayed with
worse weapons in a later period. 
RAVIZZA: I think the question we have been
asking over and over is, “How would our per-
spective shift if we asked not only about Just War
but also about just peace?” Given the dollar
amounts we discussed earlier, what would our
national budget look like if we were to take the
need for a just peace seriously? What kind of
money would we be spending right now in
Afghanistan and Iraq? What is the real cost of
modern warfare? 
One of the things that struck me when talking
with students during the Iraq conflict was that
there seemed to be an increasing willingness to
use violence. Now that we have precision mis-
siles and can readily perform surgical strikes, is
military force becoming a tool that we are more
willing to take off the shelf? Is “limited” warfare
becoming a more acceptable option in global
politics? During the Cold War, with the threat of
atomic weapons that would destroy everything
indiscriminately, the use of military force was
becoming a risk that we were increasingly reluc-
tant to take. In contrast, we now seem to be fas-
cinated with the idea that we can deploy smart
bombs and extremely expensive laser-guided
missiles to resolve our international disputes.
This concerns me. There seems to be a growing
willingness to resort to military solutions. And
what does this mean for our future?
ENDNOTES
1. For Hobbes (1588–1679) the “state of nature” was in a
sense the original state of humans outside of, or prior to,
society. It was a state of war and an unhappy one where the
life of man was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
This situation gave the justification for the creation of soci-
ety. The idea is influential for some in thinking about the
relationship between different states—in other words, inter-
national relations are seen as in a Hobbsian state of nature
(even if the people within each society/state have escaped
this). Put differently again, for Hobbes humans are not nat-
urally social but antisocial—they only choose society to
escape their natural antisocial tendencies and the bad conse-
quences these bring about. [Original text can be found in:
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, originally published in 1651
(New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1958), pp. 106-7.]
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This article is excerpted with the author’s permis-
sion from a more lengthy presentation delivered on
March 25, 2003, at Trinity Lutheran Church in
Tacoma, Washington. NOTE: Perry’s views do not
necessarily to reflect those of the U.S. Government.
In the Western monotheistic religions ofJudaism, Christianity, and Islam, weencounter a mixture of moral values—some
restraining war, others promoting it. I think it’s
fair to say, though, that the problem of total war
has been more frequent in these faiths due to a
more intense fear of unorthodox beliefs and
idolatry.
Frequently in the Hebrew Bible, love of one’s
neighbor is said to be a fundamental duty; in
fact, love is to extend beyond one’s religious or
ethnic kin to include resident aliens as well
(Leviticus 19:17–18, 33–34). Murder and other
forms of unjust violence are forbidden (Exodus
20:13). The primary ideas underlying those
commandments appear to be: 1) God is loving;
imitate God’s love; 2) God has shown compas-
sion and mercy to you; show gratitude to God by
being merciful to others; and 3) human beings
are created in God’s image; treat them as such.
(See Psalm 145:8–9, Micah 6:8, and Genesis
1:26–27, 9:6).
If we considered these ideas in isolation from
some other biblical values and commandments,
we might infer an ethic of strict pacifism toward
human beings, an absolute duty not to kill peo-
ple. But that’s not what the ancient Hebrews
concluded, since murder and other serious
offenses (Exodus 21–22) were subject to capital
punishment. Genesis 9:6 says, “Whoever sheds
the blood of a human, by a human shall that per-
son’s blood be shed; for in his own image God
made humankind.”
We might interpret that in modern terms to
mean, “All persons have a basic right not to be
killed, rooted in their having been created in
God’s image, but they can forfeit that right if
they commit a serious enough offense.” So far,
this would only permit those who are guilty of
D A V I D  L .  P E R R Y
Former lecturer in ethics and warfare at Santa Clara University and
Professor of ethics at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. 
Ethics
and War
in Comparative Religious Perspective
25explore FALL 2003
certain crimes to be executed. And if this ethic
permitted war at all, it would seem to limit it to
the defense of the innocent against unjust
invaders, or for punishing their atrocities.
But collective punishment and indiscriminate
war were also commanded or approved in the
Hebrew Bible, especially in cases of idolatry. The
first of the Mosaic commandments prohibited
the Israelites from worshipping anyone but Yah-
weh. God demanded purity and strict obedi-
ence; idolatry and blasphemy were punishable
by death (Exodus 20:3, 5). Non-Israelites who
lived within the area believed by the Hebrews to
have been promised to them by God were seen
to pose a great temptation to them to abandon
their faith. This led them to justify the slaughter
of entire communities. Deuteronomy 20:16–18
says, “[In] the towns of the nations whose land
the Lord your God is giving you as your holding,
you must not leave a soul alive.... [Y]ou must
destroy them ... so that they may not teach you
to imitate the abominable practices they have
carried on for their gods....” 
Israel’s external enemies were first to be presented
with peace terms, and if those were accepted
then the people would be subjugated, not killed.
But if they rejected the terms, the men would be
slaughtered and the women and children
enslaved (Deuteronomy 20:10–15).
Turning to the Christian New Testament, one
question that has been the subject of consider-
able debate is whether Jesus was a pacifist. Some
passages in the Gospels seem to clearly imply
that, but others are more ambiguous.
Matthew 5 reports Jesus as saying: “You have
heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, Do not resist
an evildoer. [I]f anyone strikes [or slaps] you on
the right cheek, turn [and offer him] the other
also.... You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall
love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I
say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those
who persecute you.” These sayings seem to
imply a strict rule of nonviolence.
By contrast, when Jesus spoke with Roman sol-
diers, he did not recommend that they abandon
their profession in order to serve God (Luke 7).
Now an argument from silence is risky, but it’s
puzzling how Jesus would have reconciled the
military profession with nonresistance to evil
and love of enemies. Also, the Gospels portray
Jesus as using some degree of intimidation or
force to eject the merchants from the Temple in
Jerusalem (John 2:13–16). 
In light of this puzzling combination of texts,
how did the early Christian community answer
the question of whether force could ever be
morally justified? Many of them seem to have
constructed a dual ethic, one for Christians and
another for the state. I’ll use Paul, Tertullian of
Carthage, and Origen of Alexandria to illustrate
this. Those three influential Christians interpreted
Jesus’ teaching and example to prohibit all uses
of force by Christians, not only in self-defense
but apparently even in defense of other innocent
people.
Paul wrote to Roman Christians (Romans 12):
“Do not repay anyone evil for evil, but take
thought for what is noble in the sight of all….
Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave room
for the wrath of God.” Over a century later, Ter-
tullian wrote (On Idolatry) that when Jesus
rebuked the disciple who defended him at his
arrest, he in effect disarmed every soldier. He
explained to Roman rulers (Apology) that Chris-
tians believe it’s better for them to be killed than
to kill. And he stipulated (On the Crown) that
when soldiers convert to Christianity, they must
When Jesus spoke with Roman soldiers, he did not recommend that they abandon their
profession in order to serve God (Luke 7). Now an argument from silence is risky, but it’s
puzzling how Jesus would have reconciled the military profession with nonresistance to
evil and love of enemies.
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leave the military. Origen claimed that Jesus pro-
hibited homicide, so Christians may never kill or
use violence for any reason (Against Celsus; Com-
mentary on Matthew 26:47ff.).
Now these views are internally inconsistent: It’s
not possible to rule out killing entirely, and then
permit it on the part of the state. But it’s impor-
tant to recognize that these authors—and possi-
bly most early Christians—thought strict paci-
fism to be the only acceptable ethic for followers
of Jesus.
In the Islamic tradition, the Qur’an repeatedly
refers to God as compassionate and just. The
Qur’an also says that “there is no compulsion in
religion” (2:256), meaning that one’s submission
to God must be freely and sincerely chosen, not
forced (Ali). The Qur’an urges Muslims to use
“beautiful preaching” to persuade people to
accept Islam, and to “argue nicely” with Jews and
Christians who are seen as worshipping the same
God as their own (16:125, 29:46, Firestone). 
Those ideas taken in isolation might tend to pre-
clude holy war, and perhaps even ground some
form of pacifism. Indeed, the Prophet Muham-
mad was said to have practiced non-violence
during the first 12 years of his prophetic career,
even in the face of serious persecution by poly-
theists in Mecca (Kelsay; Hashmi). The
Prophet’s stance during that early Meccan period
eventually served as the model for a nonviolent
Islamic movement in 20th-century Afghanistan
led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a friend and admirer
of Gandhi (Easwaran).
But after the Prophet’s escape to Medina in 622,
he came to believe that God permitted and com-
manded the use of force in defense of his grow-
ing religious community. Qur’an 22:39–40
(Firestone) says, “Permission is given to those
who fight because they have been wronged ...
unjustly expelled from their homes only because
they say, ‘Our Lord is Allah.’” Like the Hebrew
Bible, the Qur’an mandates capital punishment
for certain offenses, though it also urges mercy
and forgiveness in other cases. Muhammad often
urged diplomacy rather than war to resolve dis-
putes (Hashmi).
But some scholars believe that particular verses
in the Qur’an (9:5 and 73) and other sayings of
the Prophet go beyond defensive and retributive
uses of force to permit offensive jihad to expand
the territory of Islam. “Jihad” can refer to the
struggle of the individual Muslim to conform his
or her will to Allah’s, or to a peaceful effort to
persuade others to accept Islam. But jihad can
also mean holy war. In fact, there’s a sense in
which the only completely just war in Islamic
terms is a holy war, since it has to be approved by
proper religious authorities and waged to defend
or promote Islam or the Muslim community
(Kelsay).
So in spite of the Qur’anic statement against
forcing religion on others, Muslim leaders
have sometimes threatened to kill unbelievers if
they did not accept Islam. Although Islam
spread to some parts of the world such as
Indonesia mainly by means of “beautiful preach-
ing,” much of its expansion elsewhere was due
to offensive war, first by Muhammad to unify
Arabia, then by his followers in conquering the
Middle East, North Africa, and so on. In fact,
for many years the caliphs or Muslim political
leaders were expected to wage offensive jihad at
least once a year (Johnson).
Tragically, some advocates of aggressive religious
war can still be found today in all of the world’s
major religions. What they cannot legitimately
claim, though, is that their position is the
Although Islam spread to some parts of the world such as Indonesia mainly by means of
“beautiful preaching,” much of its expansion elsewhere was due to offensive war, first by
Muhammad to unify Arabia, then by his followers in conquering the Middle East, North
Africa, and so on.
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authentic expression of their faith. Each of the
traditions I’ve discussed contains ethical princi-
ples that are incompatible with total war.
But in order for members of those faith commu-
nities to continue to believe that God is compas-
sionate and just, I think they must repudiate
claims and values in their own scriptures and tra-
ditions that are incompatible with those ideas. It
does not blaspheme or insult God to believe that
God’s actions are limited by objective moral
principles. To say that God would never con-
done or command total war or other cruelty
does not represent a significant limit on God’s
power.
Religious communities can help to ensure that
political and military leaders abide by these rules
and inculcate respect for them in the training
and management of soldiers. But just as impor-
tantly, faith communities can nurture firmly
rooted habits and dispositions of compassion
and nonviolence, reducing the likelihood and
severity of war by dispelling the fear and hatred
that too often inspire and escalate it.
David L. Perry
Former lecturer in ethics
and warfare at Santa Clara
University and Professor 
of ethics at the U.S. Army
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An anthropologist’s journey must take her outside of her own
comfortably familiar and confirming community in order to
participate in (and observe and record) the ongoing life of people
from another culture.
Logar region Pukhtun village girls waiting for class to start.
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This last year, as fortunate recipient of agrant to conduct research about theelderly, people of Turkey, Tajikistan, and
Afghanistan, I have had opportunity to interact
with many people from the Muslim societies.
However, facing the uniform disgust of Turks,
Tajiks, and Afghans about the American war in
Iraq, I have been on some painful journeys. 
In late January I settled into the Istanbul Ameri-
can Research Institute in Turkey (ARIT), only to
watch the build up toward the invasion of Iraq on
cable television. It was clear that Turks did not
approve of the war. I watched demonstrations,
one of them in person, and listened to my acad-
emic Turkish friends’ distraught and condemning
commentaries about the war over their Turkish
cooking. Those Turks with whom I interacted
were not buying the American rationale of a pre-
emptive strike against Iraq to prevent that coun-
try’s deployment of weapons of mass destruction.
In May I traveled to Tajikistan. Russianized and
secularized to a degree through their decades as
part of the Soviet Union, Tajiks still identify
themselves as Muslims. They felt sympathy with
their fellow Muslims who were suffering in Iraq,
and they were highly critical of Americans. And
like people in Turkey, they did not accept the rea-
sons the American government gave for the
attack. 
In June, I flew from Dushanbe, capital of Tajik-
istan, south to Kabul, Afghanistan, for ten days.
There I saw firsthand the devastating effects of 25
years of war. With my hostess, anthropologist
Patricia Omidian, who works for UNIFEM, I
interviewed very poor workers and clients at
women’s bakeries sponsored by the World Food
Program. We listened to poor widows, some of
them weeping, tell about their war losses and
their poverty, and how they were struggling to
feed and care for their children. I saw destroyed
buildings, graveyards of airplanes and electrical
streetcars, and huge areas of mud brick rubble
that used to be homes.
In Afghanistan, too, people were horrified over
the war in Iraq. In Kabul, I asked a young woman
whose mother is Pukhtun: “Do people appreciate
having the international European ISF rather
than the U.S. patrolling the area for peace-
keeping?” “People in Kabul who understand the
differences appreciate the ISF and prefer having
ISF instead of Americans,” she answered. “The
people out in the villages don’t know the differ-
ences. They think they are all Americans, and
they hate them.”
One Pukhtun Afghan woman told me, “The
U.S. did a bad thing, going to Iraq, fighting
against Iraq ... Hitler killed Jews, and Bush is
killing Muslims. Wherever there are Muslims he
is finding them and killing them.” 
In July I returned to Turkey. I spoke with stu-
dents, professionals, and working people.
Although usually very kind and friendly, every-
one spoke in deeply negative tones about U.S.
foreign policy and what they saw as a changed
and terrible United States. 
I asked a Turkish economist what he thought
about the concept of preemptive strike, in regard
to the U.S. attack on Iraq. “First of all, I think,
just because of 9/11, some Americans think they
have good reason to make a preemptive strike.
Only stupid people believe in this theory. I don’t
like Saddam Hussein and his sons, but no one
has the right to go and kill these people. It is exe-
cution. Where is the law? But most of the gov-
ernments are afraid of America, afraid. It is so
sad.”
A retired teacher working as a taxi driver in a
southwestern city said, “Bush is the king of the
world. So many people have died. And they have
died needlessly—only for oil.” These terse com-
ments summarized three common themes in the
more lengthy discussions of many people with
whom I spoke in these three countries: America’s
power, wielded without restraint now in the
absence of the Soviet Union’s balancing power;
If the intention of “preemptive strike” is prevention, 
many other types of preventive measures would seem 
to be more effective and avoid the unforeseen devastatingly 
negative consequences of war.
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dangerous behaviors on the part of Saddam Hus-
sein and helped him to build up his position dur-
ing the 8-year war. 
Thousands upon thousands of Iraqis and Irani-
ans became widows and orphans in this disas-
trous war, which was abetted and encouraged by
the American government in order to weaken its
enemy, the Islamic Republic of Iran. The U.S.
took the side of a repressive dictator against an
Islamic Republic that Iranians themselves
brought about through a popular revolution
overthrowing the Shah and then a referendum. 
Instead of deciding to make a friend of the enemy
of an enemy, the U.S. might have avoided politi-
cal intervention in Iran that helped lead to the
popular revolution and the Islamic Republic of
Iran in the first place. Fifty years ago, Iranians
had enthusiastically voted positively in a referen-
dum for nationalization of oil. The popular
prime minister, Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq, who
opposed western political control, had sponsored
this referendum so that more of the benefit of the
country’s petroleum resources would go to Irani-
ans, rather than to England. When Mohammad
Reza Shah Pahlavi fled the country, leaving the
power in the hands of this leader who has been
democratically elected to Parliament, the U.S.
and Great Britain saw their economic and politi-
cal control over Iran disappearing. The CIA and
the British then engineered the 1953 coup de ’etat
to reinstate the Shah and exile Prime Minister
Mossadeq. (For details, see All the Shah’s Men: An
American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Ter-
ror by Stephen Kinzer, New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 2003.) Martial law was imposed. Sub-
sequently, the U.S. government and the CIA
continued to support the Shah as he kept his
power through jailing and executing any dissi-
dents. The CIA trained his secret police in sur-
veillance and torture methods. U.S. military
trained the Iranian armed forces and maintained
a strong physical presence in Iran. 
U.S. presence in Iran resulted not in democracy
but in political repression. Under the tutelage of
the U.S., the Shah’s government prevented Irani-
ans from enjoying freedom of political expression
and democratic political participation. When I
compassion for the Iraqi people; and oil as a main
motivation for the attack on Iraq, rather than any
reasonable “preemptive strike” to prevent any
deployment of “weapons of mass destruction.”
What about this concept of “preemptive strike”?
The current on-going debates, indications about
manipulation of evidence, inability to find
weapons of mass destruction, and scandal point
to some of the problems in delineating evidence
parameters to permit preemptive strikes through
international law. If the intention of “preemptive
strike” is prevention, many other types of preven-
tive measures would seem to be more effective
and avoid the unforeseen devastatingly negative
consequences of war. What about American sup-
port for the Saudi Arabia rulers, providing them
with military and police support in exchange for
political influence and access to oil? As a result of
this partnership for repression, Saudi dissidents,
unable to influence political process in Saudi Ara-
bia, have turned to political involvement and ter-
rorism in Afghanistan, the Taliban, al Qaeda, and
now Iraq. If we are considering prevention, what
about the U.S. armaments industry, providing
any and all aggressors in the world with the mili-
tary means to inflict harm? 
Instead of a “preemptive strike,” the U.S. govern-
ment might have thought more about the poten-
tial consequences of supporting Saddam Hussein
when he attacked Iran in 1980. Saddam Hussein
apparently believed that because of the Iranian
Revolution and the newly formed Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, Iraq might be able to gain some dis-
puted territory through a war on a militarily dis-
organized Iran. In a state of enmity with the
newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran, the U.S.
favored the aggressor in this regional conflict, and
provided Saddam Hussein and Iraq with military
technology and weapons, helping to build up his
military power. 
During the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988,
Iraq deployed chemical weapons against Iranian
targets. Why did the U.S. not show more distress
about Saddam Hussein’s use of weapons of mass
destruction when he poison-gassed thousands of
his own Kurdish citizens in the settlement of Hal-
abja? The U.S. overlooked this and many other
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With the end of the end of the Cold
War, the U.S. forgot Afghanistan. If
only the U.S. had spent even the
same amount of money that they
now spend in a month in Iraq (five
billion dollars according to August
reports) to build infrastructure,
schools, and opportunities for Afghan
children. But they did not. 
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lived in Iran for two years as a Peace Corps vol-
unteer from 1966 to 1968, portraits of the Shah
necessarily took a place of honor in each shop
and public place. People did not dare say a word
against Mohammad Reza Shah or his govern-
ment. Anyone who did say anything critical of
the Shah became a political prisoner. 
What might have happened if the U.S. had not
prevented this budding democracy from blos-
soming? Perhaps the frustrated desire for political
freedom would not have eventually spilled out
in the only possible means of political organiz-
ing—by Shi’a Muslim clerics, and within their
framework—resulting in the Shi’a religious
establishment’s channeling the popular revolu-
tionary movement and transforming it into the
Islamic Republic of Iran. Given the history of
U.S. political intervention in the area, is it so
surprising that people should be suspicious of
U.S. intentions? 
I conducted my Ph.D. dissertation field research
in Iran during 1978–79 on the process of the
Iranian Revolution as seen from a village per-
spective. Among the main complaints I heard
from young villagers turned revolutionary
activists were lack of democracy and political
freedom and the U.S. political control of Iran.
“The Shah is a U.S. puppet,” demonstrators
accurately chanted, and students painted the
accusation on walls. The U.S. had continued to
support the Shah whom the CIA brought back as
head of the country in 1953, getting rid of a
democratically elected and popular prime minis-
ter in order to keep in power a Shah who would
follow their directives. During the Cold War, the
U.S. wanted pro-U.S. governments in power in
the Middle East, heads of government who
would serve as American agents in the region.
The U.S. apparently did not care about their
human rights records or lack of democracy in
their governmental systems, and in fact helped
them to repress dissidents against their monopo-
lizing power. 
In Afghanistan, the U.S. took a similar stance,
making a friend from the enemy of an enemy,
and providing that friend with huge amounts of
revenue and armaments. Together with Saudi
Arabia, U.S. funding and support helped to cre-
ate the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and al Qaeda.
The U.S. gave billions to the Mujaheddin leaders
who were fighting the Soviet Union, choosing
the most conservative and recalcitrant, Gulbed-
din Hekmatiyar, as the U.S. favorite. Then after
the Soviet Union left Afghanistan and the Soviet
Union collapsed, the U.S. had no further interest
in Afghanistan. The well-armed and well-funded
Mujaheddin leaders were left to fight it out
among themselves for control. Wanting to
monopolize power, Gulbeddin began the war
that destroyed Kabul.
With the end of the end of the Cold War, the
U.S. forgot Afghanistan. If only the U.S. had
spent even the same amount of money that they
now spend in a month in Iraq (five billion dollars
according to August reports) to build infrastruc-
ture, schools, and opportunities for Afghan chil-
dren. But they did not. With no other choice
available, parents sent their boys for food and
education to become “taliban,” students at reli-
gious schools funded by the Mujaheddin groups
and Saudi Arabia. At these schools in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, they learned an aggressive, strict,
Saudi-influenced interpretation of Islam and
received military training. They were easily
recruited to become Taliban, members of the
movement that took over Afghanistan and hosted
al Qaeda. 
Rather than indiscriminately supporting repres-
sive and brutal leaders and forces, better U.S.
strategy would be to avoid contributing to the
making of political monsters. But now the U.S. is
befriending and supporting the Afghan warlords
who rule their local areas with iron fists and
threaten the authority, power, and financial sol-
vency of the central government, because they
have expressed willingness to help the U.S. find
the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. Through their
invasion of Iraq, against world opinion and espe-
cially offensive to Muslim peoples and nations,
the U.S. has sign-posted that country as the bat-
tlefield between America and the “infidel” West
on the one hand and the Muslim world on the
other. To what terribly destructive long-term
effects might this very shortsighted “preemptive
strike” lead?
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During May 2003, Santa Clara hosted an inter-
national conference to bring together some of
the best minds in the world on this topic in
order to shed some light on the problem of
clergy sexual abuse in the Catholic Church. The
conference was funded primarily by the Bannan
Center for Jesuit Education but also received
support from the Markkula Center for Applied
Ethics, the SCU President’s Office, the College
of Arts and Sciences, and the Center for Profes-
sional Development. The conference also sought
to produce a scholarly book, Sin Against the
Innocents: Sex Abuse by Priests and the Role of the
Catholic Church (Plante, 2004), to be published
by Greenwood Press. The book is a companion
to an earlier book on this topic that was also
published by Greenwood and edited by me in
1999, Bless Me Father for I Have Sinned: Perspec-
tives on Sexual Abuse Committed by Roman
Catholic Priests. The May 2003 conference and
resulting book project included leading journal-
ists, theologians, canon and civil lawyers, ethicists,
victim advocates, and mental health profession-
als from the United States, Canada, England,
and Italy who gathered to better understand the
challenges of clergy sexual abuse in the Roman
Catholic Church following the crisis of 2002 in
the American Church. In doing so, we sought to
discuss, debate, and outline a state-of-the-art
understanding of this important problem from
multiple perspectives. Each chapter was read and
discussed among the group and feedback was
provided to the contributors for inclusion in
their final chapters. 
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Few recent topics have received the kind of media attention, heated debate, anddiscussion than the topic of sex-offending clergy, their victims, and supervisors. Itis a story about too many bishops (and priests) behaving badly when they are
purported to be the moral, religious, and ethical leaders of society. It is a remarkable story.
However, it is a complex story that has had little scholarship and discourse driven by
thoughtfulness, civility, and reason.
Clergy Sexual Abuse
and the
Catholic Church:
WHAT DO WE KNOW AND WHERE DO WE NEED TO GO?
BY  T H O M A S  G .  P L A N T E
Professor, Department of Psychology, Santa Clara University
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Sexual abuse of minors committed by Roman
Catholic priests is a problem that has existed
throughout the world and throughout the long
history of the Catholic Church. Although a clear
minority of all Catholic clergy (accounting for
perhaps 2 to 6 percent with the majority of these
offenders targeting post-pubescent adolescent
boys), some priests have tragically chosen to
become sexually engaged with children or
younger adolescents. Most of these men who
abuse minors experienced child sexual abuse
when they were young and currently suffer from
a variety of co-morbid psychiatric problems
including substance abuse, personality, mood,
and organic brain disorders. Some of these men
are amenable to treatment while others are not.
Victims usually are especially vulnerable due to
their age at the time of abuse, trust in the priest
and the Church, and personal and family stresses
that typically have occurred among victims who
may seek out the spiritual and pastoral counsel
of a clergy member. The number of clergy sexu-
ally involved with consenting adults is impossi-
ble to know at this time. Although the problem
of clergy sexual abuse is not new, the intense
media attention, public outcry, and numerous
lawsuits are indeed new.
Tragically, sexual abuse of children and adoles-
cents can be found in every area of the world and
in every profession that has access to minors.
Furthermore, since persons of varying sexual ori-
entations as well as non-celibate clergy choose to
sexually abuse minors, blaming this problem
solely on the celibacy vow or on those who
maintain a homosexual orientation is unreason-
able. Celibacy and homosexual orientations can-
not uniquely be blamed for the problem of
sexual abuse committed by priests. Clearly, sexual
abuse of minors by priests would likely continue
even if priests were allowed to marry and if all
homosexual clergy were banished from the
priesthood. 
The high frequency of sexual abuse throughout
the world does not excuse priests or the Catholic
Church for this behavior. It would be a signifi-
cant problem if only one priest sexually abused
one child anywhere in the world. We rightfully
expect much better behavior from clergy than
from the general population of men. We expect
priests and other clergy members to set an ethi-
cal, moral, and spiritual standard that is higher
than what is expected of others. We expect
priests to be closer to and more like God, bridg-
ing the gap between what is human and divine. 
Many may argue that if the percentage of priests
who sexually abuse minors is not significantly
higher than among male clergy from other faith
traditions or from the general population of men,
then why does the Catholic Church appear to be
so plagued by this problem? While there are
many possible explanations for this phenomenon
a few will be highlighted here. First, there are
about 45,000 active priests in the United States
while there have been about 150,000 during the
past 40 to 50 years. Therefore, if the 2 to 6 per-
cent figure of sex-offending clergy is accurate,
then we can expect to have between about 1,000
and 3,000 sex-offending priests currently (or
until recently) working in ministry. This number
swells to between about 3,000 and 10,000 if we
consider all of the priests working in ministry in
the United States during the past half century.
Research from the St. Luke’s Institute that spe-
cializes in the treatment of sex-offending priests
suggests that the average number of victims per
priest is about eight. Therefore, we could expect
up to 100,000 victims of priest sexual abuse dur-
ing the past 40 to 50 years. One notable case in
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We expect priests and other clergy members to set an ethical, moral, and spiritual standard
that is higher than what is expected of others. We expect priests to be closer to and more
like God, bridging the gap between what is human and divine. 
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Boston, which received intense media attention,
had 138 victims.
More importantly, however, is how the Church
structure manages these issues when they come
to light. Most faith traditions have some kind of
lay board of directors who hire, fire, and evaluate
their clergy. In a nutshell, clergy from other tra-
ditions are on a shorter leash than Catholic clergy.
If a particular religious superior such as a bishop
does not manage a complaint or a problem with
his clergy very well, then the virus of sexual
abuse can spread rapidly. Moving problematic
clergy from parish to parish without input from
various lay boards of directors allows clergy sex-
ual predators to continue to victimize vulnerable
children and others. If someone  doesn’t like how
a bishop or religious superior makes decisions,
then what recourse exists? Bishops and priests are
not elected to office and do not have contracts
that are renewed with input from lay boards. So,
while the percentage of clergy who victimize
minors and others may not be significantly dif-
ferent across the various faith traditions, the
number of victims and the ability to avoid inter-
vention and potential prosecution can be quite
different across the faith traditions, which can
result in more victims per perpetrator in the
Catholic tradition. 
The Church could have done more over the years
to prevent sexual abuse from occurring. Victims
and their families could have been   treated with
more respect and compassion. Offending clergy
could have been treated quickly and relieved
from duties that placed them in contact with
potential victims. The current media attention to
sex-offending clergy has acted as a spotlight to
examine this problem more closely and to hope-
fully develop interventions at both individual
and institutional levels. The problem of sex-
offending clergy can be complex and often lacks
simple answers. However, there are strategies and
procedures that have been successfully used with
other populations (such as mental health profes-
sionals) that can be used with the Church. We
can perhaps never totally eliminate abuse of chil-
dren among the ranks of clergy or any occupa-
tional profession but we can do much more to
minimize the risk. At stake is the moral and spir-
itual authority of the Church as well as the well-
being of countless priests and laypersons.
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The Church could have done more over the years to prevent sexual abuse from occurring.
Victims and their families could have been treated with more respect and compassion.
Offending clergy could have been treated quickly and relieved from duties that placed
them in contact with potential victims. 
During the conference
at Santa Clara in May,
Thomas Plante (left),
SCU professor of psy-
chology, participated in
one of the seminars to
discuss chapters in the
forthcoming book: Sin
Against the Innocents:
Sex Abuse by Priests
and the Role of the
Catholic Church, which
Plante will edit.
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So, where do we go from here? The following is
a list of nine important principles for the future. 
1. Protect children and families. The first
priority must be the protection of children and
vulnerable adults. Certainly, anyone who has a
sexual predilection towards children does not
belong in their company. 
2. The Church must be responsible and
accountable. Church officials must take
responsibility and be accountable for their poli-
cies and procedures to ensure that their clergy do
not victimize others. 
3. Attorneys and insurance carriers can
only help so much. While attorneys and
insurance carriers must be involved with helping
the Church cope with an onslaught of lawsuits,
the Church must answer to a higher moral and
ethical authority and perhaps have much
higher standards to uphold relative to secular
institutions. 
4. The Church should not forget its spiri-
tual and moral tradition. There is a Gospel-
based accountability to uphold religious, moral,
and ethical standards and not to simply do what
might be the most practical or expedient.
5. Zero tolerance has some appeal
although must be considered carefully.
While zero tolerance is a concept that has a great
deal of popular support, there are many complex
issues that make zero tolerance easier said than
done. Furthermore, many call for the defrocking
of sex-offending clergy. If the primary goal is to
protect children from abuse, defrocking a priest
may not be in the best interest of keeping chil-
dren and vulnerable others safe. The Church can
use the vow of obedience to ensure that sex-
offending clergy stay far away from children and
others forever. This level of control cannot occur
in secular society once someone is released from
prison. 
6. Universality and clarity are needed in
policies and procedures. Policies regarding
how to deal with accusations of sexual miscon-
duct by clergy in terms of what the victims and
accused can expect must be made clear across the
land. These policies must be easy to understand.
Model programs demonstrating best practices
need to share their methods with others to max-
imize the chances that good strategies and meth-
ods are used everywhere. 
7. Research is needed. It is hard to solve
important problems unless good data are avail-
able to help inform policy and procedures. It
would be productive to complete comprehensive
research studies that can help us make decisions
based on the best available data. 
8. Keep the light on. Michael Rezendes from
the Boston Globe completes his chapter by stating
that the Boston Globe Spotlight Team shed light
on a very dark place and call us to continue
keeping this light on the darkness. This image is
an important one. Much good can ultimately
come out of the crisis in the American Catholic
Church if policies and procedures are developed
to minimize the sexual victimization of minors
in the present and future. The Church has much
to lose yet much to gain from the recent crisis.
Furthermore, the light shed on the sexual vic-
timization of children can be directed to all
places where children are victimized both in and
outside of the Catholic Church.
9. Follow the example of Jesus. Lessons from
the Gospel should help inform all of the Church’s
actions. Common sense and compassion must be
the order of the day rather than hysteria and rage.
Perhaps we should consider the words of Jesus
himself as quoted in Chapter 5 of the Gospel of
Matthew: “Be compassionate, therefore, as your
heavenly Father is compassionate.”
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Thomas G. Plante
Professor, 
Department 
of Psychology,
Santa Clara University
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COMING
EVENTS
SANTA CLARA LECTURE
In 1994, through the generosity of the Bannan Center, the Department of Religious Studies at Santa Clara Universityinaugurated the Santa Clara Lectures. This series brings to campus leading scholars in theology, offering the Univer-
sity community and the general public an ongoing exposure to debate on the significant issues of our time. Santa Clara
University will publish these lectures and distribute them throughout the United States and internationally.
JAMES W. FOWLER
“Theological Exploration of Vocation”
Wednesday, February 4, 2004, 7:30 p.m.
Recital Hall, Center for Performing Arts
Named a Candler Professor at Emory University in 1987, James W. Fowler earned
his Ph.D. at Harvard University in religion and society in 1971, with a focus in
ethics and sociology of religion. He taught at Harvard Divinity School (1969–75)
and at Boston College (1975–76). He pursued post-doctoral studies at the Center
for Moral Development at the Harvard Graduate School of Education (1971–72).
In 1977 he joined the faculty of the Candler School of Theology. His pioneering
research and the resulting theory of faith development have earned him interna-
tional recognition. His best known book, Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Development and the Quest
for Meaning, is in its 35th printing, and has been translated into German, Korean, and Portuguese
editions.
WINTER 2004 BANNAN CENTER RETREAT:
OUTLOOK
February 27-29, 2004
Jesuit Retreat House, Los Altos
This retreat will present an opportunity to consider your outlook on life, your unique spiri-
tuality.  Is your outlook leading you where you want to go, inspiring you with an inner sense
of hope, freedom, and peace?  Is there something you can do to enhance it and keep it in
focus?  We will pray and talk about these and other issues.
Retreat director Vince Hovley, S.J., is a staff member at Sacred Heart, a Roman Catholic
Retreat House in Sedalia, Colorado. He holds a doctorate in mystical theology. His primary
work has been spiritual direction and retreats. He also has lived and worked with the
homeless of New York and Denver, taught theology, and directed a Jesuit leadership training
program.
The cost is $96 per person for SCU faculty, staff, and graduate students, and $192 per person
for all others.
For more information or to register, please contact Jane Najour, Bannan Center, 408-551-
1951,  jnajour@scu.edu
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Balancing the pressures of work and family
is a struggle that many people face at some
point in life. In this culture where many families have two working parents,
what is the best way to achieve this balance between work and personal and
family needs? Do couples handle these challenges differently at various
points in their lives?  
In our next issue, we will explore this rich and complex subject with articles
discussing what contemporary workers face socially, professionally, and psy-
chologically in adopting healthy strategies for coping in the Silicon Valley
culture and beyond it. Faculty and staff members will also share personal
reflections on what does and does not work for them in their own lives.
next issue:
Santa Clara University, a comprehensive Jesuit, Catholic university located in California’s Silicon
Valley, offers its 8,060 students rigorous undergraduate curricula in arts and sciences, business, and
engineering, plus master’s and law degrees. Distinguished nationally by the third-highest graduation
rate among all U.S. master’s universities, California’s oldest higher-education institution demon-
strates faith-inspired values of ethics and social justice. For more information, see
http://www.scu.edu.
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